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Constitutionalism in the periphery: Revisiting the roots of self-rule 
movements in Ireland and India‡ 
TT ARVIND* AND DAITHÍ MAC SÍTHIGH† 
I. INTRODUCTION: RETHINKING COLONIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The purpose of this article is to re-examine the constitutionalism that underlay moderate self-
rule movements in Ireland and India.  In the received view, these movements represent a failed 
‘constitutional nationalism’1 which sought to reshape and reform empire and secure a higher 
degree of self-rule by working within rather than outside the structures of empire. 
Constitutional nationalism2 had deep cultural roots,3 and played a dominant role in shaping 
early colonial challenges to imperial rule.4  Ultimately, however, it failed to secure an 
acceptable measure of self-rule,5 and was supplanted by movements and ideologies seeking a 
more radical break through extra-constitutional means.   
This view is right as far as it goes, but it leaves many questions unanswered about the 
constitutional thinking that drove self-rule movements.  Why did they command so much 
support and endure for as long as they did, and why did they collapse as rapidly as they did? 
What role did the link to empire—including not just the metropole, but also the rest of the 
periphery—play in the constitutional understandings that underpinned these movements?  Did 
they leave any broader legacies in the constitutions of the states that emerged from Empire?  
How does their constitutional legacy in those states fit with the legacy of more radical 
nationalisms?  And—crucially—why did their claims have so little purchase in Britain itself?  
What was the nature of the disjunction between the constitutional nationalism of the periphery 
and the imperial constitutionalism of the metropole, and why was it so utterly unbridgeable as 
to make rapprochement seemingly impossible? 
These questions are of interest to historians of empire generally,6 but they are even more 
relevant to constitutional history.  Over the past three decades, the historiography of empire 
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has been strongly influenced by the realisation that a proper understanding of the colonial 
experience requires bringing ‘metropole and colony, colonizer and colonized’ into ‘one 
analytical field,’7 which encompasses not just the patterns of acquiescence, resistance, and 
contestation that imperial rule met with in the colonies, but also the manner in which imperial 
visions, understandings, and justifications were themselves reshaped by the patterns of 
challenge and contestation they encountered from those they sought to rule.8  In place of the 
national-imperial narratives that mark traditional accounts of empire, this approach points to 
the importance of patterns of connection, interdependence, engagement, and agency between 
metropole and periphery, and between different portions of the periphery, as well as the 
political vocabularies and frameworks that enabled sharp distinctions between metropole and 
periphery to be drawn despite those patterns of engagement and interdependence.9  
This approach has exercised considerable influence over a range of disciplines, but it has had 
relatively little impact on constitutional theory.  Thus, for example, whilst there been a 
resurgence of interest in the everyday constitutionalism that underpinned Britain’s experience 
of its empire—the role of pomp, ceremony and pageantry,10 the actions and approaches of 
administrators,11 and the motives and purposes of the high officials as well as the rank and file 
members of British expatriate communities who built the imperial project12—the everyday 
constitutionalism of those subject to Britain’s empire has received considerably less attention. 
The absence of the colonies in most histories of British constitutional thought13 reflects the fact 
that world of the metropole and the world of the periphery have long been treated as two 
different analytical fields, springing from two different constitutional imaginations.  The UK’s 
actions in the colonies, in this account, is treated as part of a different story from that of its own 
constitution, and the constitutional stories of the colonies are typically told in terms of their 
post-independence national constitution-making.14  Recent work has begun to challenge this 
absence.  The work on ‘New Dominion Constitutionalism’, for example, uses a focus on the 
first half of the 20th century to highlight the scope for new approaches to British constitutional 
history, in which a close study of reception and adaption at the periphery informs an Empire-
wide assessment of constitutionalism and supports an understanding of the evolution of the 
UK’s constitutional order.15  
This article offers a deeper challenge to the assumption that the worlds of the metropole and 
periphery occupied two distinct analytical fields.  As we show, there was in fact a considerable 
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field of ‘interdependence and engagement’ between the constitutional worlds of the metropole 
and the periphery, which exercised a lasting influence on the manner in which both conceived 
of the empire as a field of constitutional action.  Three aspects of this conception are at the 
heart of the analysis we present here.  The first is that the early self-rule movements in India 
and Ireland were rooted in the same tradition of civic republicanism that also exercised a 
formative influence over transatlantic political thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  The language they used was overtly republican, and the preoccupations of their early 
proponents very closely reflect the preoccupations of the civic republican tradition.  Secondly, 
despite these parallels, Irish and Indian actors were not simply adopting British thought.  The 
constitutionalism they developed was a constitutionalism of the periphery, which differed in 
several ways from English republicanism, in particular in relation to the position of the ancient 
constitution and the dimensions of civic virtue it emphasised.  Thirdly and finally, this early 
constitutionalism left a lasting legacy not only on constitutional thought in the colonies but also 
on constitutional thought in the UK itself. 
Part II of this paper begins by setting out the background to the emergence of early self-rule 
movements in Ireland and India, and reconstructs the constitutional ideas underlying their 
actions and the positions its leading proponents took, through an analysis of their speeches and 
writings.  It is, of course, impossible in a single article to present a comprehensive account of 
the many varieties of political thought that then prevailed in India and Ireland.  We focus on 
the activity of Henry Grattan in Ireland in the last three decades of the 18th century, and of Ram 
Mohan Roy in India in the first three decades of the 19th century.  Our choice of Grattan and 
Roy is because of the importance attached to their positions in their own time, as well as the 
symbolic place that they and the achievements with which they were credited occupied in the 
subsequent development of constitutional nationalism.  As we show through a detailed 
examination of their speeches and writings,16 their constitutional ideas were influenced by the 
civic republican tradition, but also developed that tradition in ways that have no counterparts 
in English political thought and which shaped the subsequent development of the self-rule 
tradition.   
In Part III, we consider the impact the periphery’s claims had on constitutional thinking in 
Britain itself at the time, by contrasting the constitutionalism of those claims with the 
constitutionalism that underpinned the rejection of those claims by British political and 
constitutional thinkers.  We use an examination of the views of Mill and Dicey on the 
governance of Empire, and their relationship with the general thrust of imperial policy towards 
Ireland and India, to argue that constitutional thought in the UK saw a shift away from older 
republican traditions of politics towards an interests-based constitutionalism, which saw 
government as being legitimised and justified by its efficiency in promoting interests rather 
than by liberty or consent.  This shift led to the intertwining of kindness and coercion in colonial 
governance, and played a significant role in making accommodation with the self-rule 
movements impossible.  We conclude in Part IV by considering some of the broader 
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implications of our work for the manner in which the Empire is treated within constitutional 
law in the present day. 
II. THE CONTEXT OF PATRIOTISM: COLONIAL GRIEVANCE AND THE 
DEMAND FOR PARTICIPATORY RULE 
India and Ireland occupied distinctive positions within the British Empire in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries.  Both were at least partial participants in the imperial project. Irish 
administrators17 and Indian merchants18 took advantage of the opportunities for advancement 
offered by the Empire, and both India and Ireland provided soldiers for the armed forces of the 
Empire.19  These circumstances gave the imperial connection a qualitatively different 
resonance in India and Ireland than it had in other colonies.  In addition, India and Ireland were 
also different from other colonies in constitutional terms.  Ireland was technically never a 
colony even if in practical terms it was frequently treated as precisely that.20  Before 1801, it 
was legally a separate kingdom, and after 1801 it was a part of the United Kingdom.  India, 
similarly, began under the governance of the East India Company and, after 1858, was 
governed through the India Office rather than the Colonial Office.  As a result, techniques of 
colonial rule developed for Ireland were frequently also deployed in India,21 and there were 
structural similarities in the types of issues and grievances surrounding colonial rule in both 
countries.22 The mobility of information and individuals across the empire also meant that 
movements for self-rule in both countries developed in conscious awareness of each other: 
Irish and Indian nationalists were familiar with, and regularly commented on, each other's 
conditions and concerns,23 and there was considerable personal interaction between them, 
particularly in the late nineteenth24 and early twentieth centuries.25   
A third point of distinctiveness was that both Ireland and India had a strong local deliberative 
tradition, centred on native political institutions and political frameworks that had a long 
                                                 
17 K Kenny, ‘The Irish in the Empire’ in K Kenny (ed) Ireland and the British Empire (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2004). 
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Cambridge University Press, 2006) 77—88. 
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McDonough (ed), Was Ireland a Colony? Economics, Politics and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Ireland (Dublin, Irish 
Academic Press, 2005) 145—164. 
22 CA Bayly, ‘Ireland, India and the Empire: 1780—1914’ (2000) 10 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 377, 
378. 
23 TG Fraser, ‘Ireland and India’ in K Jeffery, An Irish Empire (n 19) 77—92. 
24  SB Cook, Imperial Affinities: Nineteenth Century Analogies and Exchanges between India and Ireland (New Delhi, 
Sage, 1993). 
25 K O’Malley, India, Ireland and Empire: Indo-Irish Radical Connections, 1919–64 (Manchester, Manchester 




pedigree.  In eighteenth century Ireland, the Irish Parliament occupied a central place in 
political life.  Apart from its national importance, there were also many close connections and 
points of contact between it and the local political and discursive worlds of individual counties 
and boroughs.26  Much of the struggle around colonial grievances in eighteenth century Ireland, 
in consequence, not only took place around the political world of Parliament, but were focused 
on the position of the Irish Parliament in relation to other imperial institutions.  The position in 
India was not fundamentally dissimilar.  Although India had never had any institutions 
comparable to the Irish Parliament, it nevertheless had a strong tradition of civic engagement 
with and participation in political affairs, ranging in formality from the ak͟hlāq tradition of 
political writing27 to institutions and offices that provided vehicles for broader participation in 
the functioning of the state.  As in Ireland, much of the early struggle around colonial 
grievances took the form of attempts to translate the opportunities that had formerly been 
presented by these institutions into the systems of colonial government. 
Cumulatively, these factors meant that Ireland and India were fertile ground for a 
constitutionalism which provided a conceptual basis for the claims that were being made in 
relation to their deliberative institutions, but also retained room to express the political and 
cultural value of maintaining a link to empire.  In the remainder of this section, we begin by 
discussing how and why these factors led made India and Ireland fertile ground for a new 
constitutionalism rooted in civic republicanism (section A).  We then discuss how this tradition 
developed in both Ireland and India, against the backdrop of new forms of British colonial 
control, which were increasingly coming into conflict with rapidly evolving local ways of 
thinking about domestic institutions (sections B and C), and conclude by examining its legacies 
(section D).   
A. Republicanism, patriotism, and empire: The challenge of 
constitutionalism in the periphery 
The eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were a period of rapid change in political 
language and usage, and the meanings of terms and labels could and did evolve quite 
significantly over the course of a few decades.  By the end of the eighteenth century, the label 
of ‘republican’ had come to be closely associated with the excesses of the French Revolution, 
and was disclaimed by many Irish political figures who might have embraced it half a century 
earlier.  Nevertheless, the political thought they represented shows clear marks of the civic 
republican tradition, as received and interpreted through the lens of seventeenth and eighteenth 
century patriot thought.28 
The organising concepts of republican thought took the form of linked dichotomies. Three of 
these played a central role in republican thought in the English-speaking world, including in 
the constitutional thought that developed in Ireland and India.  The first was a dichotomy 
between liberty and slavery.  Liberty, as they understood it, falls neither into what we would 
today regard as ‘positive’ liberty nor is it ‘negative’ liberty.  Instead, liberty meant being free 
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of the dominion of another, and lay in freedom from subjugation to the will of another.  By 
definition, a person who was not in a state of liberty was a slave.29  The second was a dichotomy 
between being governed by representative institutions and being governed by despotism, or the 
arbitrary will of an individual.  Republicanism did not, unlike in the present day, require the 
absence of a king.  A constitutional monarch was compatible with a republican polity.30  What 
mattered, rather, was that powers be held in well-designed institutions which created the 
possibility of a self-governing civic life protected from arbitrary power.31  The third is a 
dichotomy between civic virtue and corruption.  Civic virtue subsists when those occupying 
public office discharge their functions in a spirit of supporting the public good.  Corruption 
exists when the advancement of the interests of a faction takes priority over the public good. 
The third of these points was of particular importance to the patriot tradition.  Eighteenth-
century Irish campaigners for legislative sovereignty used ‘patriot’ rather than ‘republican’ as 
a broad political description,32 and Indian campaigners for self-rule would use the label well 
into the twentieth century.  Both were at least partially influenced by the example of the Patriots 
in the American Revolution.33 Patriotism, as they saw it, entailed service to one’s country not 
in a spirit of self-interest, but out of a desire to promote public prosperity and the public good. 
Patriots placed a particularly strong emphasis on the importance of a commitment to the 
common liberty of the people, an attachment to the political institutions and constitutional 
arrangements that sustain that liberty, and a spirit of selfless work to improve those institutions 
and the general state of the country.34   
These points underpinned the constitutionalism that emerged in both India and Ireland in the 
wake of the pressures placed on them by British colonial policy.  Its fundamental assumptions 
reflected a vision of empire, governance, and legitimacy derived from the civic republican 
tradition—in particular, the civic republican idea of liberty as non-domination; the role it 
assigned civic virtue; and the manner in which it conceived of the role of representative 
institutions.  The periphery, however, faced a challenge in importing this tradition for two 
reasons.  Firstly, much of the republican tradition was focused on the potential tyranny of a 
king, not least because the two key republican moments in England and Scotland—the Civil 
War and the Glorious Revolution—were prompted by the action of a king.35  Ireland and India 
were, however, faced with a situation where the source of their grievances lay not in the actions 
of a king, but in the actions of a foreign legislature which itself made republican claims.  This 
meant that standard republican thought needed to be reworked to accommodate the idea that a 
legislature could be despotic.   
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University Press, 1985) 40. 
32 S Small, Political Thought in Ireland 1776-1798: Republicanism, Patriotism, and Radicalism (Oxford, Clarendon 
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This was not a trivial issue, and it was exacerbated by a second challenge.  A central pillar of 
republican thought in England was the idea of an ‘Ancient Constitution’ which had guaranteed 
liberty to freeborn Englishmen, but which had been corrupted by the passage of time and 
needed to be restored to its original purity.36  The Glorious Revolution and other constitutional 
developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were seen through that lens of 
constitutional restoration.  In Entick v Carrington, Lord Camden provided a classic statement 
of this position: 
The Revolution only restored this Constitution to it’s first Principles.  It did nothing more. It 
did not enlarge the Liberty of the Subject, but only gave it a better Security than it had before. 
It repair’d the Fabrick & might support or aid it by way of Buttress to it, but it did not rebuild 
it.37 
But it was very hard to maintain arguments around an ancient constitution in the context of 
Ireland and India.  Early thinkers in both countries did try to discover an ancient constitution.  
William Molyneux argued at the close of the sixteenth century that there was a separate Irish 
Magna Carta which created a similar constitution for Ireland as in England, giving its 
Parliament and its citizens the same liberties and privileges as were enjoyed in England, and 
making the Irish Parliament equal, rather than subordinate, to the English Parliament.38  Ram 
Mohan Roy in Bengal similarly sought to discover a quasi-republican constitution in the history 
of ancient India. Drawing on ancient legends of a conflict between sages and kings which ended 
in a massacre and a settlement, he suggested that ancient India had had a balanced constitution 
based on something akin to a separation of powers.39   
Yet these efforts were unsatisfactory, for two reasons.  Firstly, in comparison with the theory 
of the ancient constitution in England, the Irish and Indian attempts to locate one had a thinner 
evidence base.  Ancient Constitutionalists in England could point not just to Magna Carta, but 
to a succession of events as evidence of the Ancient Constitution.  As Holt has shown, the ‘Six 
Statutes’ of Edward III were as foundational to the constitutional world of seventeenth century 
England as Magna Carta itself,40 and discussions of the provisions of Magna Carta relied not 
just on the text of the provisions themselves but on subsequent cases and developments that 
were seen as reflecting the same underlying constitutional principle as the provision.41 Ireland 
and India had few, if any, such intervening constitutional moments.  The situation for India 
was, if anything, even more challenging.  Magna Carta, at least, was less than five centuries 
old when Molyneux wrote.  Ram Mohan Roy, in contrast, had to go back millennia rather than 
centuries, and it is therefore unsurprising that the idea does not feature in his later work.   
This problem was not unique to Ireland and India.  Other European countries, such as the 
Netherlands, also could not draw on recent constitutional moments, and their use of the ancient 
constitution took a less particularistic form42 in which national history—in the case of the 
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39 Rammohan Roy, ‘Modern Encroachments on the Ancient Rights of Females’ in The English Works of Raja 
Rammohun Roy (Calcutta, Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, 1995), Vol 1., 1. 
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41 See generally F Thompson, Magna Carta: Its Role in the Making of the English Constitution 1300—1629 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1948).  




Netherlands, the legends of the Batavians in the Roman period—played a very different role.43 
The second, and more troubling, issue was, however, more pronounced in India and Ireland.  
Both India and Ireland were stratified societies, with strong religious divides that could and did 
lead to periodic outbreaks of sectarian tension and violence: in Ireland, between Catholics and 
Protestants44 and, to an extent, also between Anglicans and ‘Dissenters’ (as Presbyterians were 
usually called),45 and in India, between Hindus and Muslims (and, to an extent, also between 
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims).46  In both, ideas grounded in the ancient constitution frequently 
contributed to exacerbating, rather than ameliorating, the divide. 
In Ireland, the rhetoric of the ancient constitution was closely bound up with ideas of Protestant 
privilege.  Arguments based on the ancient constitution tended to cite not just Ireland’s long 
Parliamentary tradition, but also the rights of loyal subjects of English descent to a political 
system on the lines of that prevailing in England.47  This was carried over from the world of 
English political ideas, where the idea of the Ancient Constitution was closely bound up with 
the idea that the English were a special or elect nation with a distinctive constitutional bias 
towards liberty,48 and that this character was tied to Protestantism.49  
The difficulty with this was that the majority of the people of Ireland were neither English nor 
Protestant. Some ancient constitutionalists tried to mitigate this through convenient fictions.  
Molyneux, for example, suggested that there had been so much intermarriage between the 
English and the Irish in the past that it would be impossible to prove that any given person was 
not Irish: anybody in Ireland could, therefore, claim the freedoms of Englishmen on the basis 
that they were of English descent.50 But in general, the effect of ancient constitutionalism was 
to entrench sectarian divides.  The constitution that was being claimed was fundamentally an 
English constitution which drew on English ideas of political liberty and, in consequence, 
necessarily fell victim to doubts about whether it could extend to Catholics.51  Otherwise 
reformist Protestants feared that extending liberty to Catholics would compromise the 
Protestant character of the constitution.52  The emphasis on the English origins of the ancient 
constitution also led its supporters to favour a union with the English Parliament.  Molyneux, 
despite his defence of the Irish Parliament, favoured such an outcome,53 and his call was 
periodically revived during the eighteenth century.54  This was the precise opposite result to 
that which the Patriots sought, but it was a danger inherent in the ancient constitution. 
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45 J Kelly, ‘Inter-Denominational Relations and Religious Toleration in Late Eighteenth-Century Ireland: The 'Paper 
War' of 1786-88’ (1988) 3 Eighteenth Century Ireland 39 
46 CA Bayly, ‘The Pre-History of 'Communalism'? Religious Conflict in India, 1700-1860’ (1985) 19 Modern Asian 
Studies 177. 
47 J Kelly, ‘“Era of Liberty”: The Politics of Civil and Political Rights in Eighteenth-Century Ireland’ in JP Greene (ed), 
Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600–1900 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 81 
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The position in India was not dissimilar.  Indian political thought had long associated kings 
with ritual acts of religious patronage or religious support.  These acts and rituals could, 
however, have sectarian overtones as readily as they could have more syncretic overtones, and 
they frequently contributed to destabilising relationships between different religions, including 
denominations within Islam.55  Nor was this confined to overt acts.  Political thought in India, 
much as in Ireland, was deeply divided on the question of who constituted the political 
community.  The ak͟hlāq literature in the Mughal world, for example, drew an analogy between 
the state and a human body.  The task of the state, in this tradition, was to ‘harmonise the 
conflicting interests of diverse social and religious groups’, and provide the pre-conditions for 
the maintenance of a civil society and support the struggle of individuals to achieve self-
perfection.56 There are strong and obvious affinities between this image of society and the 
image that underpinned Hobbes’ Leviathan, and Bayly has argued that it represents a kind of 
Indian civic republicanism.57  The resemblance is not coincidental.  The ak͟hlāq tradition was 
influenced by the Byzantine reading of classical Greek ideas, and incorporated Greek 
understandings of nomos (borrowed as ‘nāmūs’).58  It also had strong resonances with Hindu 
and Buddhist traditions of the virtuous cakravartin ruler and the responsibility of the state to 
support the pursuit of self-perfection. Yet although the ak͟hlāq literature’s ideas of justice, co-
operation, social harmony, and mutual sympathy did move political thought towards tolerance, 
it could also have the opposite effect.  More strident thinkers such as Shah Waliullah 
repurposed its imagery to argue that the metaphor of the body implied that only Muslims could 
be part of the political community.59 
The mixed legacy of the past troubled Indian patriots well into the twentieth century, 
confronting them with incompatible traditions and memories of past rulers.  While some 
historical figures such as the early Mughal emperor Akbar and the Mauryan emperor Asoka 
lent themselves to a non-sectarian national narrative,60 other figures central to one religious 
tradition’s view of the past, such as the Maratha king Shivaji and the Mughal ruler Aurangzeb, 
were considerably more problematic for Indian leaders seeking to craft narratives that appealed 
to both religious traditions in India.61 
The result was that patriot constitutionalism in India and Ireland had to deal with questions that 
had no counterparts in the British republican tradition, and had to do so without having the 
template of an imagined past—an Ancient Constitution—on which it could draw.  The result 
was a form of constitutional thought based on aspirational constitutionalism rather than ancient 
constitutionalism.  Taking up the key Patriot themes of service, improvement, and institutions 
that sustain liberty and improvement, its focus was on creating routes for civic participation in 
governance that would support liberty and a programme of improvement. Section C discuss 
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the key elements of this constitutionalism in greater depth, but it is first necessary to consider 
in a bit more detail the issues that led to its emergence. 
B. Colonial grievances and colonial rule 
The immediate context for the rise of patriot constitutionalism in Ireland was the role of the 
Irish Parliament.  The Irish Parliament was an old institution, which had existed since the 13th 
century.62  Until the late 17th century, however, it did not meet regularly.  It was summoned 
when finance was needed or when local grievances needed redress,63 but the country could be 
and was governed for extended periods of time without its involvement.64  The political 
changes brought about by the Civil War, the Restoration, and the Williamite Wars made it an 
institution that was less representative of the general population but also more active.  Catholics 
were excluded from being elected to Parliament in 1692 and deprived of the franchise 
altogether in 1728.65  Presbyterians (or ‘Dissenters’) were barred from sitting in Parliament in 
1704 although they retained the franchise. This meant that for much of the eighteenth century, 
Parliament consisted almost exclusively of individuals who were members of the Church of 
Ireland and who belonged to the class that would by the end of the century come to be called 
the Anglo-Irish ‘Ascendency’.66 The dominance of the Ascendency was deeply entrenched in 
Parliament’s processes and even in its visual environment.67  Notwithstanding this, however, 
Parliament’s power grew. The constant deficits run by the Irish exchequer after the Hanoverian 
succession led to it being summoned more frequently, and from around 1720 it began meeting 
in regular biennial sessions in a ‘quiet constitutional revolution’ which give it a central role in 
scrutinising government expenditure.68  
Its legislative power was, however, subject to two serious restrictions. Firstly, the English (and 
later British) Parliament regularly legislated for Ireland without the Irish Parliament’s consent.  
The Oaths Act of 1692,69 which prevented Catholics from sitting in the House of Commons 
was passed by the English Parliament, and in 1714 the British Parliament unilaterally extended 
the Schism Act,70 which curtailed Dissenting academies, to Ireland.  In 1719, it worsened 
matters with the Declaratory Act,71 declaring that it had power to legislate for Ireland and that 
the British House of Lords had appellate jurisdiction over Irish litigation.   
Secondly the Irish Parliament’s legislative powers had since 1494 been curtailed by Poyning’s 
law which gave English institutions power to rewrite Irish bills.  Poyning’s law provided that 
bills could only originate in the Irish Privy Council and not in either House.  The Irish Privy 
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Council would send the bills to the English Privy Council, which could alter or reject them.  
The Irish Parliament could accept or reject the bill as amended in England, but had no amending 
power itself.  The power to vary or reject bills was exercised frequently in the eighteenth 
century, and was a serious concern for patriots.72  Equally, while the Irish Parliament could 
exercise some control over the content of legislation by framing heads of bills which it sent to 
the Irish Privy Council to convert into a draft bill and transmit to England,73 the procedure was 
cumbersome and slowed down the legislative process, adversely affecting the Irish 
Parliament’s ability to promote commerce and industry.74  The problem was heightened by a 
series of laws passed by the English Parliament, which restricted Irish economic activity.  The 
Woollen Act of 169975 banned the export of Irish wool overseas and the Cattle Act of 166776 
closed the English market to Irish beef, pork and bacon, while the Navigation Acts of 166377 
and 167178 prevented Ireland from trading directly with the colonies.  The Irish Parliament was 
largely powerless to intervene, and it was against this background that patriot constitutional 
ideas began acquiring growing currency in Irish elite opinion.   
The grievances that led to demands in India for greater involvement in government can be 
summarised more briefly.  Unlike Ireland, India did not have a parliamentary tradition, but it 
did have a tradition of local institutions and offices through which elites could participate in 
government, and a traditional vocabulary of ethical government on which elites could draw.  
The emergence of British rule disrupted these.  Former Mughal elites who witnessed the 
transition to company rule lamented the new rulers’ failure to adhere to traditional standards 
and practices.79  Equally, local assemblies such as the pañcayat, whose discursive and 
adjudicative role had expanded with the Maratha state, were important pre-colonial vehicles 
for public participation,80 but their colonial equivalents, such as the senior judiciary and juries, 
were closed to Indians. Cornwallis as Governor-General had issued a blanket prohibition on 
appointing natives to positions of trust and responsibility, believing their character to be 
deficient.81 The regular imposition of press censorship meant that other vehicles for public 
discussion of government were also restricted. Early Indian demands were, accordingly, 
oriented around recreating opportunities for participation in colonial government. 
C. Colonial constitutionalism: Key themes 
The key demands of the Patriot party in the Irish Parliament were achieving free trade, 
repealing the Declaratory Act, amending the legislative procedure set out in Poyning’s law, 
securing an independent judiciary, and enacting some measure of Catholic relief.  Between the 
late 1770s and 1782, most of these were achieved, culminating in the achievement of full 
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legislative independence in 1782.  Catholic representation, in contrast, proved much harder to 
obtain.  Although the vote was conceded in 1793, Grattan’s attempt to enable them to sit in 
Commons failed in 1795, with Fitzwilliam, the viceroy, who was sympathetic to the cause of 
Catholic emancipation, being recalled to England and replaced by a more hard line figure.  The 
failure of Catholic representation also marked the final failure of the Patriot project. Following 
the 1798 rebellion, Ireland was incorporated into the United Kingdom and the Irish Parliament 
dissolved.  In India, the debates centred around press freedom and reform of the revenue, 
judicial, and legal systems, both to provide opportunity for civic participation in colonial rule, 
and to create colonial institutions that were responsive to local needs.  The renewal of the East 
India Company’s charter in 1932 provided a focus point for these demands as did, in a less 
obvious way, the passage of the Great Reform Act.  Roy played a leading role in this movement, 
drafting petitions and providing detailed evidence to Parliament.  As with the Irish patriot 
project, however, his attempts also ended in failure, with Parliament making few, if any, 
concessions to his demands.   
The following discussion is organised around the Irish context, primarily because of the greater 
quantity of documentation available in English. However, it also examines the debates in India, 
which closely paralleled it.  It focuses on two specific themes: firstly, the demand for 
commercial freedom, its connection with legislative sovereignty, and the vision for imperial 
links it implied; and secondly, the nature of the polity, the people it included, and the basis of 
political obligation. As we show, in each of these areas, Irish and Indian actors drew heavily 
on patriot conceptions of improvement, liberty, civic pride and sympathy, and the importance 
of participation to institutional legitimacy. 
1. Reimagining the link: Public improvement, civic pride, and national 
liberty 
The civic republican tradition in Britain in the eighteenth century was much occupied with a 
debate that is often termed the ‘wealth versus virtue’ debate.  Was the growth of commerce a 
corrupting influence on the body politic, or was it a benign influence which promoted arts, 
science, and progress?82  The issue divided political thinkers in Britain, but in Ireland and India, 
the debate took on a very different character.  Far from being viewed with suspicion as a source 
of corruption, it was seen as a source of civic pride.  
Colonial thinkers were not alone in this shift.  It was most fully theorised by Dutch republicans, 
who argued that the suspicion of wealth in classical republican thought reflected its relationship 
with societies characterised by ‘agriculture, slavery, and militarism’.  In modern polities which 
were based on commerce, it was love for the country and its form of governance that were of 
greater importance.83 In addition, the colonial context permitted the corrupting force to be 
ascribed to British wealth, exercised on British institutions, which made those institutions 
agents of tyranny vis-à-vis the colonies.  Because the interests of British manufacturers were 
so influential in the British Parliament, Britain imposed restrictive policies on the colonies 
stunting their economy for Manchester’s sake.  The success of local manufacture and 
commerce, in contrast, was a matter of civic pride and, to patriots, civic pride was crucial to 
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the maintenance of a free constitution.84  In the wake of the Act of Union, it was the pride in 
Ireland’s commercial progress that Grattan would highlight as one of the Irish Parliament’s 
main achievements. The result was that the British Parliament’s restrictions on the wool trade 
was as much a cause of complaint in Ireland as restrictions on industrialisation in India would 
be a century later, and in arguing for legislative autonomy Grattan would repeatedly tie the 
case to restrictions imposed by the British Parliament: 
where is the freedom of trade? where is the security of property? where is the liberty of the 
people? I here, in this Declaratory Act, see my country proclaimed a slave! I see every man in 
this House enrolled a slave! I see the judges of the realm, the oracles of the law, borne down by 
an unauthorized foreign power, by the authority of the British Parliament against the law!85 
Grattan’s language here is explicitly republican in its invocation of slavery and domination, 
but it embodies a distinctive version of republicanism in which it is not just the individual but 
also the country that is rendered a slave, and where the dominating power is not another 
individual but another country.  The nature of the domination Grattan described, however, is 
also important to understand the aspirational constitutionalism it reflected and the nature of the 
link it saw a colony free from domination maintaining with the imperial power.  
As a previous section has discussed, patriot political thought emphasised the importance of 
selfless devotion to the country and one’s fellow citizens.  In the eighteenth century, this took 
the specific form of working for improvement—that is to say, for economic development and 
national economic progress.  Working for improvement was a central part of patriotism and 
Parliamentary public spirit in eighteenth-century Ireland.86  As Rees has shown, the Irish 
patriots of the early part of the eighteenth century focused their attention on practical and 
pragmatic policies of economic development, rather than on constitutional issues.87 Their 
achievements were considerable and included the Newry canal, the first inland canal anywhere 
in Britain or Ireland,88 as well as a range of other measures to promote and regulate 
commerce.89  The growing prominence of constitutional issues did not disrupt this project.  
Rather, it reflected a sense that the limitations of the Irish Parliament’s powers were a serious 
hurdle in the furtherance of this project.90 
The impetus for improvement was built on the role sentiments of fellowship played in patriot 
political thought.  The affection between fellow-citizens that formed the basis of a republic 
depended on a feeling of affection which in turn built on the sentiment Adam Smith would 
describe as sympathy.91 This understanding of the sentiment that binds members of a polity 
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was, in patriot thought, translated into a very distinctive understanding of Empire, and of the 
nature of the links that constituted Empire, which saw the links lying in the sympathy generated 
by shared constitutional values, rather than in hierarchies of command and control or the bonds 
of allegiance between inferior and superior.  The nature of this link was summarised by Henry 
Grattan in 1782, at the culmination of his campaign for Irish legislative sovereignty: 
This nation is connected with England not by allegiance only, but liberty… Ireland has British 
privileges, and is by them connected with Britain; both countries are united in liberty… Liberty, 
we say, with England; but at all events liberty.92 
This contrasted sharply with the tighter, hierarchical relationship created by the Act of Union: 
similarity of constitutions is no longer the bond of connection, all are to be swallowed up, 
according to this doctrine, in one imperial Parliament, whose powers increase as the boundaries 
of the empire contract, and the spirit of her liberties declines.93  
Put differently, in patriot thought, the bonds of a shared constitution could and did create a 
natural and productive link based on sympathy and a shared commitment to civic improvement.  
A distant shared legislature, however, would be ‘free from the influence of vicinity, of 
sympathy.’94  The form of relationship created by the Union ran contrary to Patriot principles 
because it was neither ‘an identification of interests’ nor ‘an identification of feeling and of 
sympathy.’ It was, rather, an ‘act of absorption’ by which ‘the feelings of [Ireland] is not 
identified but alienated.’  All that it produced was ‘Irish alienation.’95 
In the light of the subsequent history of Britain, Ireland, India, and the rest of the Empire, this 
dimension of Patriot thought appears prophetic, and we will return to the question of why 
greater account was not taken of it in Part III of this article.  Before that, however, it is worth 
noting the parallels with the position taken by Roy. 
India in Roy’s era presented a radically different social and political context from Ireland.  
Unlike Ireland, there were no national institutions or a national polity.  Much of the country 
was still part of one of hundreds of Indian kingdoms.  The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
had also been a time of war.  The slow collapse of the Mughal state had led to the governors of 
many formerly Mughal provinces setting themselves up as independent kings, and it had also 
opened large areas of the country to invasion: large and formerly prosperous cities such as 
Delhi were pillaged and sacked on more than one occasion.96  The Maratha expansion into the 
North came to an end in the 1760s, and was followed by a slow retreat and eventual collapse.97  
Although the British bridgeheads in India—Bengal, Bombay, and Madras—were located in 
relatively calm provinces, they were nevertheless embedded in a region disrupted by military 
conflict. The British claim to have instituted better governance and established safety was not 
wholly accurate—British intervention frequently escalated conflict, and tended to create what 
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Bayly has accurately termed a ‘European military despotism’.98  Nevertheless, Indian 
quiescence in the face of that claim should be seen against this background of turbulence.99   
Roy, like Grattan, did not seek to end the link to Britain. His starting point, again like Grattan’s, 
was in the idea that for the link with Britain to endure, the people would need to acquire a form 
of attachment to Britain.  The British policy of excluding Indians from positions of 
responsibility, however, had operated in a way that degraded Indians and caused them to be 
alienated from the government, rather than encouraging them to feel a bond of attachment to 
Britain: 
men of aspiring character and members of such ancient families as are very much reduced by 
the present system, consider it derogatory to accept of the trifling public situations which 
natives are allowed to hold under the British Government, and are decidedly disaffected to it.100 
Roy believed that this reflected a view that Indians were less capable of improvement and 
possessed a weaker character than Europeans—a view he rejected.  Writing, as he put it, in 
‘very moderate language’,101 he pointed out that Indians ‘have the same capability of 
improvement as any other civilized people.’102  The difficulty, however, was their reduction to 
a ‘selfish and servile’ state which led them to abuse whatever arbitrary power they had.103 
Roy’s political activity was directed towards improvement away from this state of things, and 
a key dimension of that was reducing the degrading alienation and expectation of servility that 
Indians experienced in everyday life under British rule, of which Roy had personal 
experience.104  Indians, Roy pointed out, rarely encountered Europeans from a position of 
equality, forcing them into a submissive position.105 The problem would be reduced if Indians 
saw 
that their merits were appreciated, that they might hope to gain an independence by honest 
means, and that just and honourable conduct afforded the best prospect of their being ultimately 
rewarded by situations of trust and respectability.106 
Although Roy engaged closely with Parliament’s enquiry into the renewal of the East India 
Company’s charter, he did not have much faith in its ability or willingness to provide relief.  
Like Grattan, he appears to have held a view that there was little scope for sympathy between 
Indians and a remote Parliament.  In a biographical sketch written after his death, a close 
associate reported that he felt that in colonial matters  
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the Minister was absolute, and the majority of the House of Commons subservient; there being 
no body of persons there who had any adequate motive to thwart the Government in regard to 
distant dependencies of the British crown.107 
A more practical option was to work with local institutions of British rule in the East India 
Company to achieve practical measures of progress. Roy saw in commerce a promising 
template. The security of tenure and commercial opportunities British rule had brought had 
provided considerable opportunities for improvement.108  Nevertheless, there were significant 
blind spots.  The government showed considerable indulgence to landlords, but not to the actual 
cultivators who lived in ‘very miserable’ conditions, subject to rents which left ‘little or nothing 
for seed or subsistence to the labourer or his family.’109  The government’s failure to address 
the needs of ordinary Indians troubled Roy, who felt that the potential fragility of Indian loyalty 
to Empire were not properly appreciated by Britain.  In a letter to a progressive English friend, 
Roy expressed himself with somewhat more candour than he did in his published work.  
Britain, he said, had the choice of having India 
either useful and profitable as a willing province, and ally of the British Empire, or troublesome 
and annoying as a determined enemy.110 
Its lack of attention to the actual needs of Indians, or to the underpinnings of bonds of loyalty, 
were pushing it in the latter direction. 
2. Constituting a people: Governments, popular participation, and civic 
virtue 
A second theme in colonial constitutionalism arose out of the need to define who and what 
constituted the polity.  The position of Catholics in Ireland was a particular point of contention, 
and became more contentious after the Constitution of 1782 gave the Irish Parliament the 
power to remove their disabilities.  Successive attempts at Catholic relief were watered down, 
but disabilities on their ability to lease, own and inherit property were lifted in 1782, and they 
received the vote on the same terms as Protestants in 1793.   Granting them the right to sit in 
Parliament, however, proved more difficult.  The Irish Commons had historically included 
Catholics as well as Protestants until the Civil War.  James I created new boroughs to attempt 
to entrench a Protestant majority, but was forced under pressure to reduce it to a nominal 
number.111  Catholics were excluded under Cromwell, but returned to Parliament after the 
Restoration.  The Williamite settlement, however, again excluded them.  Although the Articles 
of Surrender were ambiguous, the Oaths Act of 1692 altered the oath of supremacy to require 
a rejection of transubstantiation, which had the effect of excluding Catholics from Commons 
and a range of professions.112  In 1728, Catholics were deprived of the vote. 
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Protestant dissenters (who were mostly Presbyterians) were also not wholly trusted by the 
Ascendency and were subject to some legal disabilities,113 but these were considerably less 
severe than those that applied to Catholics.  The main disability that applied to them was the 
inability to hold civil or military office.  This was the result of the introduction of what was 
called the ‘Sacramental Test’ in 1704, which barred them from holding civil or military office.  
They were never, however, subject to the broader range of disabilities that affected Catholics, 
nor were they ever deprived of the vote.  Underlying this was the fact that the ‘Protestant 
constitution’ could accommodate Dissenters more easily than it could accommodate Catholics. 
One of the characteristics of Dissenter political discourse was the ease with which it could 
combine a strong sense of Protestant supremacy with strident criticism of the Ascendency,114 
and the Sacramental Test itself was not a creation of the Irish Parliament.  It had been inserted 
by the English Privy Council into the 1704 statute (which the Irish Parliament had drafted to 
only apply to Catholics) in exercise of its powers under Poyning's Law.115  Once introduced, it 
was staunchly defended by the Church of Ireland,116 but was ultimately abolished in 1780.  
Extending full constitutional liberty to Catholics, in contrast, was much more controversial 
because it sat uneasily with the place Protestantism occupied in the Anglo-Irish constitutional 
imagination, as a previous section has discussed.  
Grattan, however, strongly supported Catholic representation, and his speeches show the 
importance of patriot constitutionalism to his thought.  Grattan argued that without full Catholic 
equality, Ireland would not be a polity: 
The question is now… whether we shall be a Protestant settlement or an Irish nation... The 
question is not, whether we shall shew mercy to the Roman Catholics, but whether we shall 
mould the inhabitants of Ireland into a people: for so long as we exclude Catholics from natural 
liberty and the common rights of men, we are not a people.”117 
Underlying this was a characteristically patriot emphasis on the importance of affection for and 
attachment to institutions, rather than simply obedience to them.  In patriot thought, obedience 
by itself did not and could not form a sustainable basis for a polity.  It was, instead, necessary 
for individuals to love the institutions of their country, and the patriot’s task was to ensure that 
institutions were worthy of the public’s affection.118  Grattan’s arguments for Catholic 
emancipation closely reflect this view: 
The relation in which the Protestant stands, makes him a party to the laws; the relation in which 
the Catholic stands, makes him the object of the law; not party.  He is not a party to the law, 
and the law is a party against him; therefore the laws may be objects of his obedience not his 
affection.119 
The failure to provide for Catholics also played a role in Grattan’s opposition to the Act of 
Union: 
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This fabric he calls a Union… it is no Union; it is not an identification of people, for it excludes 
the Catholics… it is an extinction of the constitution, and an exclusion of the people.120 
The repeated reference to the people, however, has a significance in Grattan’s speeches that 
goes beyond Catholic emancipation.  Grattan’s view was that it was the people, as distinct from 
the Government, who were the true object of Parliament’s duties.  In criticising Parliament’s 
opposition to a tax on English absentee landlords, for example, Grattan argued that Parliament 
was ignoring its duties to the people in pursuit of satisfying the government: 
We had been advised to reject this tax in order to pursue the principle of conciliation; 
conciliation with whom? The absentees, or the people.  It is very remarkable, that, speaking of 
conciliation and mildness, we should proceed as if we had no people whatsoever; and provided 
we pleased the court, or that body whom the court espoused, we accomplished every purpose 
of harmony.121 
It would be anachronistic to link this to popular sovereignty in the modern sense, but it reflected 
a point that was fundamental to patriot thought in the English speaking world.  States were 
fundamentally polities: groups of citizens, linked by common bonds of sympathy and 
solidarity, and a love of the institutions that created them.122  Governments were necessary, but 
always subject to the danger of corruption and the pursuit of personal or factional interests at 
the expense of those of the polity. A strong culture of civic participation, and institutions to 
support that culture, was therefore seen by patriots as being an essential aspect of free 
constitutions.123   
This was of particular importance in Ireland.  The achievement of legislative independence in 
1782 was widely believed to have been possible only because of the Irish Volunteers.  The 
Volunteers had originally been formed in 1778 when, with the Army engaged in the North 
American campaign, Ireland was believed to be vulnerable to French and Spanish invasion in 
support of the American cause.  The membership of the Volunteers was drawn from the 
propertied and commercial classes, and they explicitly depicted themselves as having been 
formed ‘to guard the constitution’.124  Although their members’ political views varied, they 
broadly supported both free trade and Irish legislative autonomy, and the concessions obtained 
from Britain were ascribed to the strength of the Volunteers.125  
Grattan praised the Volunteers, and the role of public associations in inspiring the Commons 
to act for an object that was in the public interest.126  This was not, however a reflection of their 
martial virtue, but of the civic virtue that they displayed by participating in the formulation of 
policy to the public benefit, a position that was behind Grattan’s reluctance to fully support the 
Volunteers in their later activities.  In 1793, he tentatively supported disarming the Volunteers 
hand-in-hand with genuine constitutional reform.  In contrast, when the government introduced 
a Convention Act, which would entirely ban conventions of the type that had secured legislative 
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independence in 1782, and of the type which Catholic associations and the United Irishmen 
were then using to press for reform, Grattan said it was: 
directly adverse to the genius of the constitution, and goes to destroy its resuscitative power, by 
incapacitating the people from acting in important cases by delegation; the only way, when, in 
such emergencies, they can act with constitutional energy.127 
Grattan made this point even more forcefully in 1797, when the government embarked on a 
policy of coercion in Ulster in response to the activity of the United Irishmen.  A Parliament 
which threw in its lot with ministers in such a situation, Grattan argued, was betraying the 
people: 
We were called upon to attaint a people; to attaint a people for high treason, on the charge 
preferred by a minister… An Irish Parliament was called on to take the word of a minister, and 
on that word to attaint their country of treason.128 
Whilst the government claimed its opponents were committing treason, the government that 
was guilty of a greater treason: 
The treason of the minister against the liberties of the people was infinitely worse than the 
rebellion of the people against the minister.129 
The patriot claim to colonial self-government, in other words, reflected the idea that the state 
consisted of its people, that its institutions owed their duties to that people, that the people 
exhibited civic virtue through selfless participation in public affairs, and that a free constitution 
would prize such participation.  A constitution that lacks such institutions not only lacks 
vehicles for a virtuous citizenry to display their virtue, but also lacks vehicles for aspirational 
constitutionalism. 
These ideas also animated Roy’s political campaigns.  Roy had an expansive understanding of 
the polity—one which encompassed not only Indians, but also Europeans resident in India.  
Calcutta had a population of Indo-Portuguese, and Roy closely followed the progress of the 
Iberian revolutions.  In 1822, Roy organised a celebration for the second anniversary of the 
proclamation of constitutional government in Portugal, and the interest was reciprocated: the 
reissue of the 1812 Cadiz constitution was dedicated to Roy by the Spanish reformers who 
issued it.130  The events, as Roy saw them, were part of a struggle ‘between liberty and tyranny 
throughout the world’.131 Roy was also a strong supporter of the Great Reform Act and 
celebrated its passage, announcing that he would have renounced his connection with England 
had it not passed.132 
Nevertheless, Roy was frustrated by the ‘opposition and obstinacy of despots and bigots’133 
which, he felt, led to Indians having few opportunities to develop an attachment to the 
institutions of British India, or participate in its government.  Britain, he said, had a tendency 
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to make rules for India ‘without consulting or seeming to understand the feelings of its Indian 
subjects’, even after half a century of rule over India.134 Roy’s solution to this was institutional.  
Local institutions and forms of rule had remained stable despite the slow collapse of Mughal 
and Maratha rule,135 and they had permitted participation through local assemblies such as the 
pañcayat and through the ability to hold office in royal government.  Much of Roy’s 
campaigning was directed to trying to create similar opportunities for Indians under British 
rule.  The reforms he proposed were modest: he proposed a judiciary consisting of mixed 
benches of Indians and Europeans,136 the revival of pañcayats as a legal institution (and not as 
a merely informal body as they had become under British rule) that discharged the role of the 
jury,137 the creation of a local court of appeal to replace the appeal to the Privy Council,138 and 
the creation of codes of law for India based on local custom, and in particular ‘those principles 
which are common to, and acknowledged by all the different sects and tribes inhabiting the 
country.’139  He also called for an end to the practical discrimination that restricted their access 
to government jobs (for example, testing candidates on Latin and Greek, or on Christian 
doctrine), and for Indians to be fully admitted to all professions.  
As Bayly has pointed out, in making these points Roy was deeply influenced by the 
constitutional importance of popular representation in government140—a view which, as we 
have seen, was shared by Grattan. This also applied to the exercise of arbitrary power against 
other forms of popular participation.  Roy took a leading part in the protest against the Press 
Regulations which had led to suppression of the Calcutta Journal and the expulsion of its 
editor, James Silk Buckingham.  In a memorial to the Supreme Court challenging the 
regulations, Roy argued that the Regulations challenged a fundamental principle of liberty: 
After this sudden deprivation of one of the most precious of their rights… a right which they 
are not, and cannot be charged with having ever abused, the inhabitants of Calcutta would be 
no longer justified in boasting… that they are secured in in the enjoyment of the same civil and 
religious privileges that every Briton is entitled to in England.141 
It was only through full civic participation that Britain could create a genuine polity in India to 
which Indians would feel they belong.  As Roy put it in evidence submitted to Parliament: 
I have no hesitation in stating… that the only course of policy which can ensure [the Native 
community’s] attachment to any form of government, would be that of making them eligible to 
gradual promotion, according their respective abilities and merits, to situations of trust and 
respectability in the state. 142 
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D. The legacies of Empire 
In their own day, Grattan’s and Roy’s projects were failures, and the question of whether their 
actual achievements deserve the position and credit they were subsequently given,143 and 
whether their ideas could have formed a workable basis for a reimagined Empire, remain 
controversial. 144 These debates are, however, orthogonal to the purposes of this article.  Our 
purpose is not to vindicate Grattan’s or Roy’s ideas, but to locate it within the history of 
constitutional thought, and trace the impact it had on subsequent constitutional thinking in 
Ireland and India.  This is important not just for its historical interest, but also for what it tells 
us about the role played in the present day by the constitutional legacies of Empire.  Much of 
the recent work on the constitutional legacy which Empire left for the colonies has focused on 
the institutional legacies of Empire—the institutional structures of government, the locus of 
governmental power within those structures, and the relationship of those institutions to each 
other.145 Our focus, in contrast, is on the conceptual dimension of the legacies of Empire—
specifically, its impact on the political and intellectual vocabulary and frameworks which 
nationalists of all stripes used to think not just about institutional structures and relations, but 
about the tasks of government vis-à-vis the citizenry, and the mutual relationship of state, 
government, citizen, and polity.  
A first legacy was in relation to the relationship between national liberation movements and 
the broader Empire.  Grattan’s and Roy’s views were, as we have seen, grounded in a particular 
view of the imperial link.  For subsequent generations of Irish and Indian activists this became 
a project of imperial emancipation, which sought to create a periphery-centred vision of empire 
and imperial governance grounded in a sense of the commonality of aspirations across the 
periphery.  Indian nationalists, starting with Roy himself, commented frequently on the Irish 
cause: the phrase ‘glorified parish council’, which acquired considerable currency during the 
debates over Scottish devolution in the 1990s, was originally coined by an Indian nationalist, 
Aurobindo Ghosh, in response to the 1907 Irish Council Bill.146  Irish nationalists, too, saw 
themselves as actors on an imperial stage: Parnell repeatedly took up the Boer cause in 
Parliament, and Imperial policies towards South Africa, India, and Egypt were the subject of 
strident criticism by politicians and the popular press.147  There were also strong interpersonal 
contacts: the Indian Home Rule League was founded by Annie Besant, an Irish nationalist 
resident in India, and Indian nationalists MPs at Westminster like Shapurji Saklatvala were 
among very few voices to oppose the partition of Ireland under the Anglo-Irish treaty.148  
A second legacy was the continuity of language and conceptual frameworks in Ireland and 
India, even among radical nationalists who rejected the moderation of Grattan and Roy.  Ghosh, 
for example, in an early piece criticising moderates, argued in language that mirrored Grattan 
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and Roy that they raised institutions ‘to the rank of a fetish’.  The effect of doing so was ‘simply 
to become the slaves of our own machinery.’149  The parallels to Roy’s criticism of ‘servility’ 
is obvious. Equally, the image of the nation enslaved became a core part of nationalist 
vocabulary.  Tamil nationalist poetry, for example, repurposed the mediaeval tradition of 
depicting Tamil as a woman to depict India as a woman in chains.150  
A similar connection can be seen between Grattan and the thinking of pre-partition Sinn Féin.  
Although Sinn Féin rejected Home Rule as insufficient, it did not at its founding demand a 
complete break with Empire.  Instead, it sought to create a relationship similar to the Austro-
Hungarian dual monarchy. This was obviously similar to the 1782 settlement, and Sinn Féin’s 
policy of abstentionism from the UK Parliament was based on an argument from Grattan about 
the illegitimacy of the abolition of that settlement by the Act of Union.  Grattan had argued, 
citing Locke and Puffendorf, that the Irish Parliament did not have the power to create a 
legislative union with Britain: 
Parliament is not the proprietor, but the trustee; and the people the proprietor, and not the 
property… it is appointed for a limited time to exercise the legislative power for the use and 
benefit of Ireland, and therefore precluded from transferring, and transferring for ever, that 
legislative power to the people of another country.151 
Arthur Griffiths echoed this language in his founding manifesto for Sinn Féin. The Irish 
Parliament still existed, and MPs for Ireland had a constitutional duty to convene as that 
Parliament rather than as part of the British Parliament.152 His reliance on Grattan did not, 
however, reflect any admiration of Grattan, about whom Griffiths was scathing. He saw Grattan 
as lacking the courage of his convictions,153 and blamed his acquiescence in the disarming of 
the Volunteers for the downfall of the Irish Parliament.154  Yet, when seen against the 
background of the substantial constitutional ground they shared, the disjunction between them 
seems less about basic constitutionalism and more about the means that might be adopted to 
secure that constitutionalism—a difference that, in turn, closely parallels eighteenth-century 
debates about the relative importance of martial and commercial virtue in civic patriotism.  The 
more hard line nationalist positions represented by Ghosh and Griffiths, from this perspective, 
represent not a rejection of the constitutional goals of Grattan and Roy, but rather a 
reincorporation into them of the tradition of martial virtue that Grattan and Roy rejected. 
Focusing on the conceptual, rather than institutional, legacies of empire helps us better 
understand the impact of patriot thought on the constitutions of Ireland and India, both of which 
are expressly republican.  Consider the Directive Principles, which both the Irish and Indian 
constitutions share. The following article occurs in both constitutions with nearly identical 
wording.  
The State shall strive to promote the 
welfare of the whole people by securing 
 The State shall strive to promote the 
welfare of the people by securing and 
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and protecting as effectively as it may a 
social order in which justice and charity 
shall inform all the institutions of the 
national life. 
 
—Constitution of Ireland, Article 45(1)   
protecting as effectively as it may a social 
order in which justice, social, economic 
and political, shall inform all the 
institutions of the national life. 
 
—Constitution of India, Article 38(1) 
Coffey has shown that this provision was influenced by the Weimar constitution155—an 
influence that is easily intelligible in view of the ideas shared between the Indian and Irish 
patriot traditions and the European republican tradition.  Against the backdrop of the patriot 
tradition and the colonial grievance that gave it its power, this provision can be read as a 
declaration of the significance and importance of aspirational constitutionalism.  The patriot 
tradition emphasised the need to incorporate a constitutionalism of protest which 
accommodates and channels into the institutions of the body politic the voices and claims of 
dissenting groups that might otherwise find themselves alienated from the polity.  As Khaitan 
has persuasively argued, the accommodation of dissenting groups and voices is a key purpose 
of the Directive Principles.156  Indeed, in the Indian context they arguably build—precisely as 
Roy did—on ideas common to ak͟hlāq, the vedantic (and Buddhist) conception of the role of 
the state in self-perfection, and the characteristically patriot idea of the state as a vehicle for 
improvement.  A similar point could be made about the more radical ideas about ‘extern 
ministers’ and popular initiatives in the 1922 constitution of the Irish Free State,157 the original 
vision of a single unified civil service in revolutionary Ireland, which would have let a county 
clerk rise to the level of the secretary of one of the great Departments of state,158 and the debates 
in the early years of independent India of what the executive structures of the Westminster-
style constitution would actually mean in the new dispensation.159   
At their core, these provisions sought to create a more organic polity which would give the 
public a stake in the institutions of government that was simultaneously greater, more direct, 
and more developed than the institutions of the British constitution had ever permitted.  This 
helps give more context to a key finding that has emerged from recent historical work on the 
path to independence, which has shown how many independent countries did not simply adopt 
but actively sought to repurpose the institutions of imperial rule to their own ends.160  The 
constitutionalism of the periphery, in other words, developed and embedded into the republican 
constitutions of India and Ireland a dimension of the civic republican tradition which was 
wholly distinctive to the periphery, and which both underpinned and gave a wholly different 
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significance to the seeming institutional continuity between their pre- and post-independence 
governmental structures.161   
III. LIBERTY, COERCION, AND KINDNESS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF 
COLONIAL POLICY 
This article began with the objective of putting the world of metropole and periphery in a single 
analytical frame.  The one piece of that picture that remains to be discussed is the British 
position.  Why did the claims of the colonies have so little traction in Britain, and what were 
the constitutional ideas that underpinned the position Britain eventually adopted?  As this 
section discusses, the answer to these questions is both interesting and potentially troubling, 
not least because it sits uneasily with the republican tradition to which theorists of the British 
constitution continue to lay claim.162   
By the late nineteenth century, a consensus had emerged in Britain about the appropriate way 
to respond to demands for Irish Home Rule, juxtaposing conciliation (or ‘kindness’) and 
coercion.163  This policy was most formally articulated in relation to Ireland—in particular, in 
Arthur Balfour’s policy of ‘killing Home Rule through kindness’—but it also underpinned the 
approach to India.164  In the course of an essay on the Irish question, Dicey explained the 
constitutional logic behind this approach.  The functioning of the English constitution meant 
that, in practice, it was the sentiments of English voters, rather than the Irish Parliamentary 
Party, that was the primary restraint on government action in Ireland: 
Humanity and a sense of justice would, one may hope, make it impossible for the English 
democracy to tolerate courses of action which would be repudiated by the very advisers who 
now recommend them, the moment when the actual results of such courses became visible to 
all observers.165 
If, however, Ireland failed to respond to conciliation, then there would be a ‘growth of a general 
conviction that justice had been tried with Irishmen in vain, and that there was nothing left for 
England but to show her power’, against which no amount of Parliamentary strength for Home-
Rulers would avail.166 Dicey also argued that English public opinion had shifted in favour of 
imperialism because of the view that an empire was necessary to ‘maintain the power and the 
authority and the greatness of England’—in effect, a shift towards seeing Imperial governance 
in the light of the contribution the Empire made to serving Britain’s political needs.167  The 
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campaigns against Home Rule in England were, therefore, underpinned by an emphasis on the 
negative consequences for England.  
These points, however, do not entirely answer the puzzle which this section set out to address, 
not least because Grattan expressly considered them.  To Grattan, the idea that coercion was a 
price worth paying for mildness was unsupportable:  
their logic appears to be little more, than that in consideration of a mild government, you should 
suspend civil liberty, and in consideration of the blessings of our constitution, you ought to 
deprive three-fourths of the inhabitants of its franchises; in other words, that in gratitude for the 
blessings of the constitution, you are going to surrender it to the crown.  The sophism… 
mistakes the constitutional checks on government, for the natural mildness of its character, and 
infers that we should give up those checks to fortify the government; it proposes to put down 
the constitution to strengthen the government168 
In response to the contention that coercion was necessary to save Ireland from the United 
Irishmen’s Jacobinism, Grattan responded angrily that it was the government’s coercion that 
was Jacobin, not the actions of the United Irishmen: 
Away with the system of coercion; the Jacobinal system.  What is the Jacobinal system?  It is 
a contempt for human rights, and a violent encroachment on the laws.  What has been our 
system of coercion, but a violent contempt of the rights and franchises of our fellow-subjects, 
and a violent outrage on the laws; it has been law-making in the spirit of law-breaking169 
Far from avoiding tyranny, the effect of enabling coercion would be to create tyranny, because 
it would create: 
a minister perfectly uncontrollable and irresponsible… Such a minister would be a monster, the 
spring of every action, and with the executive power of both… Such a minister is a tyrant.170 
Equally, Grattan (and Roy) went to lengths to try and demonstrate that Ireland and India would 
show more, not less, solidarity with Britain were they to be granted a greater measure of 
participation in their own rule.   
Why, then, did British constitutional thinkers place so much emphasis on English public 
opinion, and so little on Irish or Indian? The answer, we suggest, lies in the manner in which 
political and constitutional thought in Britain had begun to view the question of authority in an 
imperial world, moving away from a principles-based constitutionalism legitimised by liberty 
and consent towards an interests-based constitutionalism legitimised by efficient and effective 
governance.  Mill drew a sharp distinction between countries whose inhabitants had a national 
character marked by ‘savage life’, with little law, commerce, manufacture, and agriculture, and 
more civilised nations such as Britain.171  Savage countries were ill-served by letting them rule 
themselves.172  India was explicitly placed in this category by Mill,173 and despite the general 
impression that he was sympathetic to Ireland, he appears to have believed that Ireland, too, 
belonged there.  To Mill, the best way to rule a people unfit for self-rule was through what he 
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termed ‘progressive colonial despotism’ and in his critique of Britain’s history in Ireland, he 
faults it for failing to have imposed a progressive colonial despotism there. 174 
What did Mill mean by national character?  It is clear that he did not see it as being racial: 
national character was mutable and evolved over time.175  What he appears to have meant, in 
the terminology of modern social science, was that the capacity for self-rule requires informal 
institutions that facilitate and provide an environment for self-rule, and have a propensity to 
produce agreement around principles of the sort that had come to be accepted as sound in 
England.  These institutions could be acquired by acculturation.  The Scots and Welsh, Mill 
held, had benefitted through the Anglicisation that accompanied their union with England, and 
the same could happen with the Irish.176  Absent such acculturation, however, colonised people 
are unfit to rule themselves because they lack the moral and political sentiments which such 
institutions engender.  The best that can be done for them is progressive despotism.   
Mill’s views are not easy to account for.  It is striking that his views on Ireland and India do 
not engage with the arguments of Grattan and Roy, even though both were well-known in 
England.  After Union, Grattan sat for many years as an MP in the UK Parliament, and his 
views and thought were well-known in Liberal circles.  Roy, too, was a minor celebrity in 
England, and was described by Bentham as his ‘intensely admired and dearly beloved 
collaborator in the service of mankind.’177 That Mill pays so little heed to their views on the 
Irish and Indian capacity for self-government is not easy to explain.   
Nevertheless, Salisbury's notorious comment that one could no more justify giving free 
representative institutions to the Irish than to the Hottentots178 arguably reflect a position close 
to Mill’s views on national character, as does the juxtaposition of coercion and conciliation in 
Dicey’s thought and British policy.  Coercion, to the extent it saves the masses from misrule 
by the unfit, is in this view itself an act of kindness. 
From the perspective of patriot political thought, it is self-evident that this was bound to fail to 
appeal to the people of India or Ireland. Benevolent tyranny is still tyranny; and if what should 
be a matter of right is no more than a matter of grace, then the subject is still a slave. Dicey’s 
position may well have been that the rejection of kindness would leave no option but coercion, 
but the response from the colonies could equally be that if every demonstration of civic virtue 
was rejected, then there was no option but direct action.  Against this background, it easy to 
see why the problem was so intractable and would, ultimately, lead both India179 and Ireland180 
to reject constitutional nationalism altogether in favour of a more complete severance of the 
imperial link.  
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In his Isiah Berlin lecture, Quentin Skinner pointed to the parallels between anti-colonial 
movements and the republican concept of liberty as non-domination.181  Despite that 
provocative point, the relationship between moderate self-rule movements and republican and 
patriot political thought has largely remained unexplored, and little has been done to bring the 
two into a single analytical frame. The history not just of the constitution, but of political 
thought in the UK more generally, is almost invariably told without reference to the Empire.  
It is telling, for example, that Dicey’s views on empire were not discussed in legal scholarship 
until very recently, and that Greenleaf’s magisterial history of the British political tradition 
lacks the final volume on the influence of empire which it was projected to include.   
Against that background, this article has sought to recover an important but neglected 
dimension of how people thought in the past about the constitution of empire: the attitudes, 
understandings, and value commitments that underpinned their actions, and the legacy it has 
left in our present day thought, principles, and institutional arrangements.  The era when we 
could tell the story of the UK’s constitution as an unbroken progression centred on England, 
from the Glorious Revolution, via Entick v Carrington, to Dicey and the present day, is long 
past.  The Empire intervened in that story, and as we have sought to show, it is time it also 
intervened in the way in which we seek to study and understand the UK’s constitutional 
development. Equally, the experience of empire left its legacies on constitutions and 
constitutional thought around the common law world. Putting the focus back on the legacies of 
empire is useful because it helps us understand what was gained and what was lost in the 
process. 
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